For my explanation of how libertarian freewill is dependent upon the necessity of sufficient divine grace, I will once again refer the reader to the following statements.

The Five Articles of the Remonstrants

Article 3
That man does not posses saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as in his state of apostasy and sin he can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is necessary that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, and will, and all his faculties, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me you can do nothing.”

Article 4
That this grace of God is the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of all good, even to the extent that the regenerate man himself, without prevenient or assisting, awakening, following and cooperative grace, can neither think, will, nor do good, nor withstand any temptations to evil; so that all good deeds or movements that can be conceived must be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. But with respect to the mode of the operation of this grace, it is not irresistible, since it is written concerning many, that they have resisted the Holy Spirit (Acts 7, and elsewhere in many places).

The Works of James Arminius: On the Free-Will of Man

This is my opinion concerning the Free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.

Previously, when we were dealing with Theological Libertarianism, there was only one particular man, namely, Adam, in very particular circumstances, in the original state of righteousness, and just one action under consideration, the first sin. However, in order to discuss the possible actions of every man, the proposition, “Man freely refrains from sin,” will no longer, by itself, be robust enough for our purposes because it can only handle omissions of sin. It lacks explanatory power for dealing with many forms of truly good acts, since only some and not all omissions of sin are in fact truly good acts. For example, the positive act of believing in Christ, that is, saving faith, cannot be properly expressed as merely not committing sin. Furthermore, the positive act of refraining from certain acts of sin, such as murder, may also be accomplished by ungodly, self-righteous motives (e.g., the so-called virtuous pagan or moral heathen)—which, in this case, would mean that the very act of refraining from an act of sin is itself a sin; as it is written, “all our righteous deeds are like a filthy garment,” and, “to the pure, all things are pure; but to those who are defiled and unbelieving, nothing is pure, but both their mind and their conscience are defiled.” Nonetheless, it still remains true that this ungodly person can freely refrain from an act of sin, such as murder.

The reader may also notice that the descriptions of what a man will in fact freely do has been removed from the scope of my arguments (with the exception of a cameo appearance at the end). We shall only be concerning ourselves with what man can in fact freely do at any given moment. The reason I have limited the scope of topic to human ability and potential is because I learned very quickly that any attempt to derive the logical connections between what a man is doing (the present tense of will do), and what he can presently do becomes excessively complex.

It will be useful to briefly explain the nature of “can” and how it relates to human freewill potential. To demonstrate, let us use a simple analogy about walking. (We shall assume that walking sideways is impossible.) Each of the following propositions are distinctly different, even if subtly so.

(1) “I can walk forward.”
(2) “I can’t walk forward.”
(3) “I can refrain from walking forward.”
(4) “I can’t refrain from walking forward.”

The first claim is straight-forward enough: there is something that I can do, namely, walking forward. But notice how saying that (2) I cannot do something is not the same as saying (3) I can not do something. For the second claim, (2), implies that there is some hindrance or barrier making it literally impossible to do something—it simply can’t be done. Whereas the third claim, (3), implies that I really can do something but it also just so happens that I can also refrain from doing, or I can simply not do, that thing.

The fourth claim, (4), is a little different. For it can be interpreted in different ways. For instance, if we interpret this through Determinism then it implies that there is some sort of irresistible mind compulsion at work that is literally making it impossible for me to refrain from doing something—I can’t not do that thing. Mind you, this is more than a mere physical force; this is more than someone grabbing you by the arm and forcing your hand to slap your own face. This is also more than a mere allurement or enticement to do something. For this is an external force of some kind that is causing an internal compulsion upon the human volition, think Jedi mind-control: when an independent, external entity is forcefully causing a person’s mind to think certain thoughts or do certain things against or in place of that person’s own present will. This is exactly how Theological Determinism operates. William Lane Craig puts it like this, “God could [irresistibly] force everyone to repent and be saved by overpowering their wills, but that would be a sort of divine rape, not their being freely saved. It’s logically impossible to make someone do something freely. So long as God desires free creatures, then, even He cannot guarantee that all will freely embrace His salvation” (Craig, Politically Incorrect Salvation). I will interpret the fourth claim about being unable to refrain from doing something through the lens of Libertarianism in a moment.

Moreover, the following four propositions are also distinctly different.

(5) “I can walk backward.”
(6) “I can’t walk backward.”
(7) “I can refrain from walking backward.”
(8) “I can’t refrain from walking backward.”

However, in order to make our set complete we would then need to make another assortment of eight more expressions to represent the variations for what a man will do; for example, “I am walking forward” and “I am walking backward” and “I am refraining from walking forward,” etc. Bringing us up to 16 statements that would all need to be included and pieced together to show how each is logically connected to the others. Fun stuff, but excessively complex. And it gets trickier yet when we start throwing in the doctrines of justification and sin, and so on. So we will make this as easy as is reasonable for ourselves and just stick to the eight variations of what a man can do.

So, let us begin setting down the definitions we shall be using to form the argument for Theological Libertarianism. If the reader has seen my previous blog, they will notice some significant changes have been made to some of the following definitions.

Note: I will be using Man as a generic label for any morally culpable person that may exist at any given time.

Definition 1: (F₂) “Man can freely do a truly good act” — to be able to do what is good and pleasing to God; to be capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace. For example, to act upon justifying, saving faith or to be able to endure, or escape from, temptation with godly motives (1 Corinthians 10:13-14).

Definition 2: (¬F₂) “Man cannot freely do a truly good act” — it is impossible to be able to do what is good and pleasing to God. There are certain circumstances under which God gives a man over to the impurity of his own heart: when God does not extend sufficient divine grace to him. Whether God permits this for a time and a season or unto the man’s death is God’s just and sovereign prerogative. During this time of judgment, or “passing over,” Theological Libertarianism tells us that man remains genuinely free (recall, Libertarianism does not require that an option always be available to a person in order for them to make genuine freewill decisions). Nonetheless, since man is necessarily dependent upon sufficient divine grace in order for truly good acts to be available to him; since he “does not posses saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as in his state of apostasy and sin he can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good”; therefore, during this time of judgment, man cannot freely do any truly good acts; yet, he remains genuinely free to do any act of sin he desires, insofar as they are available to him (this is me not so subtly hinting to what is commonly known as restraining grace). In other words, since, even if God were giving him sufficient divine grace, the man would continue to freely sin; therefore, when God withholds sufficient divine grace from the man, God is still not forcing or violating the man’s will. In fact, God is merely giving the man exactly what he wants.

Definition 3: (F₄) “Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act” — this is always the case, with one possible exception: there may be certain circumstances in heaven that make it impossible for man to refrain from doing some truly good act. As it is written, James 4:17, “to one who knows the right thing to do and does not do it, to him it is sin”; see also, 1 John 3:17). Thus, if one in heaven knows that something is the right thing to do then they cannot freely refrain from doing that thing without committing an act of sin; therefore, they will always freely do that truly good act. However, this does not necessarily mean that man’s freewill in heaven shall be without a variety of opportunities and methods for accomplishing such an act.

Definition 4: (¬F₄) “Man cannot freely refrain from doing a truly good act” — while it is true that this claim may be interpreted as portraying Determinism; it is also true that this may be interpreted as accurately portraying the state of man in heaven. For the Bible tells us quite clearly that there will be no sinning in heaven. It seems more likely to me that man cannot sin in heaven for the simple reason that man will not ever refrain from doing those things that are truly good in heaven. But, when it comes to immutable states, it is impossible to logically determine the priorities of cannot from can not; that is to say, it is impossible to logically determine whether a person doesn’t do something because of a genuine inability or because of an ability never acted upon. All things being equal, however, if for whatever reason the act of sinning is an unavailable option to choose from in heaven then Theological Libertarianism still remains true. Likewise, we may say the same concerning those in hell who cannot and will not ever refrain from the free act of hating God.

Definition 5: (S₂) “Man can freely do an act of sin” — simply, a man is freely able to disobey God’s commandment, resist sufficient divine grace (2 Corinthians 6:1), and act contrary to God’s nature (1 John 2:16) and the original image man was created in.

Definition 6: (¬S₂) “Man cannot freely do an act of sin” — this is only possible, if ever, in heaven; see Definition 4.

Definition 7: (S₄) “Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin” — this is always metaphysically possible, with one exception, as it seems to me: those in hell who cannot and will not ever refrain from freely hating God. As I previously explained, even the ungodly can freely refrain from doing certain acts of sin whenever they so choose.

Definition 8: (¬S₄) “Man cannot freely refrain from doing an act of sin” — this is metaphysically impossible, with one exception: those in hell who cannot and will not ever refrain from freely hating God.

Definition 9: (G) “God gives Man sufficient divine grace” — by sufficient divine grace, I am specifically referring to that prevenient or assisting, awakening, following and cooperative grace which is necessary and sufficient for man to remain in his original state of righteousness, to be converted from a state of total depravity, to be kept from sin and preserved in the way of salvation.

Definition 10: (¬G) “God does not give Man sufficient divine grace” — you get the idea.

Definition 11: (R) “Man is righteous” — to be upright or unfallen; to be judicially declared or imputed as not guilty and innocent by God through justifying, saving faith; to be a child of God, at peace with God. Notice I have removed “nature” from this expression in order to make this a catch-all phrase for any kind of Christ-centered righteousness that may be applicable to man. It is important that the reader does not confuse this with the righteousness or unrighteousness of an act. For example, it is possible for a Christian to freely commit an act of sin while still remaining righteous. This is because they are being justified by an enduring, even if weak, faith in Christ. In other words, unlike Adam, a Christian’s righteousness is not his own but it is the righteousness of God in Christ being imputed to him. While this is by no means a license to sin, it is a testimony to God’s abounding kindness and patience towards us.

Definition 12: (¬R) “Man is unrighteous” — to be fallen and sinful, not upright; to be without justifying, saving faith; to be a child of the Devil and under God’s wrath.

Now, we are ready to derive the premises to form a more complete proof for Theological Libertarianism.

Premise 1: Necessarily, if Man is righteous then God gives Man sufficient divine grace

I take this premise to be axiomatic, that is, self-evident. For it is not possible for man to be righteous or to please God at any time without the aids of sufficient divine grace. Remember, as I have defined it, to be righteous could indicate either man in his original state prior to the first sin or it could indicate a sinner who has been justified, awakened and regenerated by the Holy Spirit or, lastly, those who have entered into the eternal state of glory.

As mentioned previously, merely refraining from sin does not always constitute a truly good and righteous act. For this reason we can no longer get away with speaking of sinning and refraining from some act of sin as though these were always logical opposites—this relation is only consistent when man is in his original state of nature before the first sin. From this point on, we will have to be more precise and speak of being able to do what is truly sinful, that is, an act of sin, as opposed to being able to do what is truly good, that is, doing what is pleasing to God. Thus,

Premise 2: Necessarily, God gives Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is possible Man can freely do an act of sin or Man can freely do a truly good act

From Premise 1, when a man is righteous it is necessary that it also be true God is giving him sufficient divine grace; in other words, it is not possible for God to withhold sufficient divine grace from a righteous man because God has sworn by His own holiness to be faithful to and bless those who love Him (1 Corinthians 10:13-14 and many other places). However, when a man is unrighteous, that is, when a man by his own fault is in a damnable state, it is not necessary for God to bless him by extending sufficient divine grace and mercy to that man. For when a man is unrighteous then it is God’s free and sovereign prerogative alone (Romans 9:16) to either graciously extend mercy to that unrighteous man or to curse that man and bring about his just destruction at the time of God’s own choosing; as it is written in Ezekiel 18, 33, 36 and Jeremiah 18 and many, many other places. Fortunately, God in his compassion has freely chosen to extend sufficient divine grace to all mankind and in His justice to withhold it only from those who refuse to repent and believe in His Name (Luke 6:27-36; John 3:16-18; 1 John 2:2). Therefore, since it is only possible for a man to be cursed by God if that man is first an unrighteous sinner,

Premise 3: Necessarily, Man is unrighteous if and only if it is possible God gives Man sufficient divine grace or God does not give Man sufficient divine grace

In the event that God determines to freely withhold sufficient divine grace from a man then it is necessary that this man first be unrighteous and thereby worthy of being cursed; lest God should be the author of sin, as the Bible says. And it necessarily follows that if God has given a man over to the lusts of his fallen, depraved nature then that man will freely continue in sin, and that perpetually. Moreover, if man will freely continue in sin then it obviously follows that he can freely sin. And, lastly, since man is necessarily dependent upon the aids of sufficient divine grace in order to ever do anything that is truly good, it also follows that, during this time of hardening, this man cannot possibly do anything that is truly good.

Premise 4: Necessarily, God does not give Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is necessary Man is unrighteous and Man can freely do an act of sin and Man cannot freely do a truly good act

Lastly, It will always be true, while in this world, that a man can freely refrain from committing a truly good act and that a man can always freely refrain from committing an act of sin. For example, when God is not giving a man sufficient divine grace, it is impossible for that man to actually do a truly good act; nonetheless, it still remains true that the man can freely refrain from committing a truly good act. And, again, even the ungodly can freely refrain from certain acts of sin, even though everything they do is ultimately sinful. Therefore,

Premise 5: Necessarily, Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act and Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin

I have opted to make three separate proofs: one for Theological Libertarianism before the first death, another for the life to come in eternal glory and a third for the second death in eternal torment. Had I not done this then I would’ve had to add all kinds of intricate qualifiers, such as, “Man is in a glorified state” or “Man is justified by faith,” etc. So, having set forth these definitions and properly arranged them, without further ado, for the viewing pleasure of the reader, I present the following expanded formulation for Theological Libertarianism of what man can do while in this present world.

[Proof for Theological Libertarianism: what man can do while in this present world]
Premise 1: Necessarily, if Man is righteous then God gives Man sufficient divine grace
Premise 2: Necessarily, God gives Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is possible Man can freely do an act of sin and Man can freely do a truly good act
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man is unrighteous if and only if it is possible God gives Man sufficient divine grace or God does not give Man sufficient divine grace
Premise 4: Necessarily, God does not give Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is necessary Man is unrighteous and Man can freely do an act of sin and Man cannot freely do a truly good act
Premise 5: Necessarily, Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act and Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
——————
Conclusion 1: …

I will draw your attention to notice that I did not provide any particular conclusion since I did not specify which man is in view or which circumstances apply to this man. Moreover, I have minimized the number of premises and logical connections that could’ve been made in order to highlight what I find to be the most significant points of interest, while still covering as many potentials as possible, and I have left the rest for the reader to discern. (Enjoy!) For example, I take it for granted that the reader has discerned from my explanations that if God is not giving sufficient divine grace then it is impossible for man to be able to freely refrain from the particular act of hating God, even though he can freely refrain from other acts of sin. Furthermore, objectively speaking, from God’s point-of-view, whenever a man is outright, willfully hating God then, by implication, this man ultimately hates his neighbor and loves sin. I also take it for granted that the reader is capable of intuitively determining how what a man will do is related to what he can do.

For these last two arguments, I will be pretty much skipping straight to the finished proofs, since everything has already been sufficiently touched upon. Although, I will be forced to add a few somewhat peripheral definitions in order to properly present the relevant matter.

Definition 13: (E) “there are other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision” — I made a brief reference to this earlier; see Definition 3. By opportune acts, I simply mean any variety of truly good acts that is pleasing to God, given the circumstances.

Definition 14: (¬E) “there are not other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision” — this seems to me a highly unlikely scenario, but I can think of no good reason to eliminate it. It is at least logically possible that there may be some circumstance in heaven for which there is only one possible method to accomplishing some particular goal. Perhaps such an act might be the act of loving God; for while there are certainly many fruits of love, there is only one foundational root.

And, for these final proofs, even though I tried to keep away from including what a man will do in these proofs, it just seemed to be lacking without it. But these definitions should be quite familiar from my previous article and really need no explaining.

Definition 15: (¬S) “Man will freely not commit an act of sin“

Proof for Theological Libertarianism: in eternal glory (i.e., heaven)
Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Man sufficient divine grace and Man is righteous and Man can freely do a truly good act and Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
Premise 2: It is possible, Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act if and only if there are other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man cannot freely refrain from doing a truly good act if and only if there are not other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision
Premise 4: Necessarily, Man will freely not commit an act of sin
——————
Conclusion 2: Therefore, [whatever else we may conclude,] necessarily, Man will freely not commit an act of sin

Note: By Premise 2 and Premise 3, my intention is to indicate the distinction between a goal to be accomplished and the act or manner in which it is done. For example, let us say someone has a genuine need for food: 1 John 3:17, “whoever has the world’s goods, and sees his brother in need and closes his heart against him, how does the love of God abide in him?” We are not necessitated to give this person a particular type of food, since we could give them any number of different edibles. Moreover, we don’t have to actually give them any food at all, since we could also give some money for them to buy food. Therefore, we are free to accomplish this goal (which would otherwise be a sin for us to refrain from doing) in several opportune ways at the moment we are deciding to help our neighbor. But I suppose there may be certain goals that can only be accomplished in one specific way.

Definition 16: (S) “Man will freely commit an act of sin“

Proof for Theological Libertarianism: in eternal torment (i.e., hell)
Premise 1: Necessarily, God does not give Man sufficient divine grace and Man is unrighteous and Man cannot freely do a truly good act and Man can freely do an act of sin
Premise 2: It is possible, Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man will freely commit an act of sin
——————
Conclusion 3: Therefore, [whatever else we may conclude,] necessarily, Man will freely commit an act of sin

Note: for Premise 2 and Premise 3 of this final proof, remember to keep in mind the distinction between the act of refraining and the act that has been refrained from.

________________________________________

For the following discourse, it will not be necessary for the reader to understand the subtle nuances between the various forms of Determinism (e.g., Compatibilism, sometimes called Edwardianism, and Calvinism), as my arguments will be focused strictly upon the philosophy of Determinism simpliciter. That is, since whatever will be true of my arguments against the most fundamental principles of Determinism will also be true of any other philosophy or theology which is derived from these most basic components of the philosophy of Determinism; then, by demonstrating the philosophy of Determinism to be Biblically errant, it will necessarily follow that all other philosophies and theologies which are derived from it are Biblically errant and can be safely rejected to the glory of God. For this reason all that will be needful is for the reader to understand what is meant by the statement, “all events that obtain (including all the decisions human-beings make) are causally determined by the prior state of affairs.” To better grasp what is meant, let us borrow a concept from Physics. In Physics, which studies the motion of objects, we all take for granted Newton’s First Law of Motion which summarily says, “Every object remains in a state of constant velocity unless acted upon by an external unbalanced force.” This is precisely analogous to the principle Determinists have in mind when they speak of human freewill. For they are thoroughly persuaded that the human will, or volition, is causally determined by the prior state of human nature. Due to the theological context of this article, we shall be using “human nature” to indicate merely a righteous nature or a sinful, unrighteous nature. Therefore if one’s nature is righteous then that one will freely act in strict accordance to their righteous nature. Whereas if one’s nature is unrighteous then that one will freely act in strict accordance to their sinful nature. There is a degree to which I agree this is true, however, Calvinists have applied this principle carelessly and gone too far. In the past I have addressed this problem in a blog, Systematic Psychopathology: when Calvinism contradicts the rationale of God, concerning the doctrine of Common Grace and Saving Grace, or, that is, concerning the relation between God’s divine grace and fallen, sinful humanity. I have also written another blog, Does the Drop Explain the Fall?, addressing the origin of sin in the creature, or, the relation between God’s divine grace and unfallen, righteous humanity. It is this latter topic, the origin of sin in the creature, that I will be expanding upon in this article. I shall accomplish this by presenting to the reader a series of logical arguments for why the philosophy of Determinism and, thus, Calvinism are incompatible to the Biblical narrative, Christian orthodoxy, and the glory of God.

Let us begin by setting down the definitions we shall be using to form the arguments against Determinism.

Definition 1: (R) “Adam’s nature is righteous” — to be upright, unfallen; to be without a sinful nature; the original nature Adam had when he first came from the hands of his Creator; see Ecclesiastes 7:29 or Gen. 1:26-7 & Col. 3:10 & Eph. 4:24 taken together as per The Westminster Confession of Faith w/ Scripture Proofs, ch. 4.

Definition 2: (G) “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace” — by “sufficient divine grace” I am specifically referring to that sustaining, upholding grace which was necessary and sufficient for Adam to remain in his original state of righteousness, in the state he was originally created.

This is the critical definition that Reformed theologians use for integrating their interpretation of divine sovereignty, the philosophy of Determinism, into Christian Theism. For this reason it will be helpful to emphasize how this will affect our conceptualization of divine grace. Reformed theologians commonly term this kind of grace, the kind of grace necessary for a man to be truly righteous and good, as Irresistible Grace. Why do Reformed theologians define the divine grace necessary for a man to be righteous as Irresistible Grace? Firstly, because to imply that a man could be righteous without the aids of divine grace is the heresy of Pelagianism. Secondly, to imply that a man could resist divine grace is (according to Calvinists) the error of Arminianism. For, as they mistakenly see it, this is to claim that the freewill of man is more powerful than God’s sovereign will. Therefore, it necessarily follows that if God gives Adam the kind of divine grace that is sufficient for Adam to remain in his original state of righteousness then it is also necessary that Adam remain in his original state of righteousness by freely refraining from sin.

From these two definitions we derive the following argument:

[Preliminary Argument 1]
Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 2: God gives Adam sufficient divine grace
———————
Conclusion P1: Therefore, Adam’s nature is righteous

This leads us to our third definition.

Definition 3: (¬S) “Adam freely refrains from sin” — in the philosophy of Determinism, what a man will do is being causally determined by the prior state of affairs and, thus, it is either outright false that a man can do otherwise than what he in fact does or it is completely irrelevant (since, even if he could do otherwise, he never ever would). Therefore it follows that if the prior state of affairs includes God giving Adam that divine grace which is both necessary and sufficient to make Adam righteous (as he was originally created) then Adam will not be unrighteous; that is, Adam will not do anything contrary to that sufficient divine grace; namely, Adam will freely refrain from sin.

[Preliminary Argument 2]
Premise 1: Necessarily, Adam freely refrains from sin if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 2: Adam’s nature is righteous
———————
Conclusion P2: Therefore, Adam freely refrains from sin

We must next define the negation of the previous three definitions; so that we may have all of the components we require in order to carefully scrutinize how these things all fit together.

Definition 4: (¬R) “Adam’s nature is unrighteous” — this proposition is given from the Biblical narrative (Genesis 3:6). It simply means that Adam is no longer upright. That is to say, Adam was originally made upright by God, having been upheld and sustained by sufficient divine grace, but is now fallen and sinful.

Definition 5: (S) “Adam freely sins” — this proposition is also given from the Biblical narrative (Genesis 3:6). It simply means Adam is disobeying God’s commandment and acting contrary to God’s nature (1 John 2:16) and the original image man was made in.

From these two definitions we can formulate our third preliminary argument.

[Preliminary Argument 3]
Premise 1: Necessarily, Adam’s nature is unrighteous if and only if Adam freely sins
Premise 2: Adam freely sins
———————
Conclusion P3: Therefore, Adam’s nature is unrighteous

Among Reformed theologians, how Adam, who was originally made with a righteous nature and upheld by God’s sufficient divine grace, came to possess an unrighteous and sinful nature is a mystery as deep and dark as Unconditional Election (for example, see John Piper remark on this very point; see also The Westminster Confession, ch. 3, art. viii). But is it truly as mysterious as Calvinists claim? Or is it possible the real problem is that these Reformed doctrines logically entail contradictions against the Biblical narrative and blaspheme God? If this is true then let us be aware now that no contradiction could ever be a high mystery because contradictions are not mysteries: they are simply false. In the same way that squares are not circles and bachelors are not married, underage females, so it is and so it shall be shown that Determinism is not compatible with Christian Theism.

There is no disputing that Adam freely sinned. There is no disputing that God permitted Adam to freely sin; indeed, how should anything come to pass unless God first ordained and permitted it? However, since we are assuming the philosophy of Determinism is true (as per Calvinism) then we must remember that Adam freely sinning is an act of human freewill that is being causally determined by Adam’s prior state of affairs. But isn’t Adam’s prior state of affairs, in particular, his nature, being causally determined by whether or not God is giving Adam sufficient divine grace? It most certainly is. From this we define the sixth and final definition for our arguments.

Definition 6: (¬G) “God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace” — by “sufficient divine grace” I am specifically referring to that sustaining, upholding grace which was necessary and sufficient for Adam to remain in his original state of righteousness, in the state he was originally created. Within Reformed theology this free and sovereign act of God in removing or not giving or withholding sufficient divine grace from man is commonly described as a “passing over” (see The Westminster Confession: ch. 3, Of God’s Eternal Decree, art. vii; and also ch. 5, Of Providence, art. iv).

From this we are ready to formulate our final preliminary argument.

[Preliminary Argument 4]
Premise 1: Necessarily, God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is unrighteous
Premise 2: Adam’s nature is unrighteous
———————
Conclusion P4: Therefore, God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace

Now we are ready to begin asking the difficult questions to see what we can learn from these definitions and arguments. This will clearly demonstrate to us whether or not Determinism and the doctrines of Calvinism are valid and congruent to the Testimony of God from a robust and rational Systematic Theology. Some may object to this approach because they think I am purposely avoiding or ignoring Biblical exegesis. Well, if Calvinists will happily confess that Determinism is unbiblical and that the Calvinistic definitions I have presented are unbiblical then consider myself guilty as charged. However, since no self-respecting Calvinist will confess that their Systematic Theology is unbiblical or that the Bible was avoided or ignored in proving their own doctrines then neither can I be charged for the same crime. For all I am doing here is simply assuming the entirety of Calvinism to be true, all of it; taking their own doctrines by their own definitions and their own Systematic Theology; and demonstrating from these that it necessarily follows Calvinism is unbiblical and can be safely rejected to God’s glory. So if anyone would like to attempt to refute my arguments then they must do so by showing how I have either incorrectly defined Determinism or the terms of Calvinism. And, since I only require these simple and readily accepted definitions for my arguments in order to expose the errors of Determinism, it should be evident to the reader that I have not been unfaithful to Determinists and Calvinists by ascribing anything to them that could be rejected as a straw man.

For ease of reference, here are all four of the preliminary arguments listed in order:

1. [Preliminary Argument 1]
   Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
   Premise 2: God gives Adam sufficient divine grace
   ———————
   Conclusion P1: Therefore, Adam’s nature is righteous

2. [Preliminary Argument 2]
   Premise 1: Necessarily, Adam freely refrains from sin if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
   Premise 2: Adam’s nature is righteous
   ———————
   Conclusion P2: Therefore, Adam freely refrains from sin

3. [Preliminary Argument 3]
   Premise 1: Necessarily, Adam’s nature is unrighteous if and only if Adam freely sins
   Premise 2: Adam freely sins
   ———————
   Conclusion P3: Therefore, Adam’s nature is unrighteous

4. [Preliminary Argument 4]
   Premise 1: Necessarily, God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is unrighteous
   Premise 2: Adam’s nature is unrighteous
   ———————
   Conclusion P4: Therefore, God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace

Now that we have taken a moment to review each of these components, let us begin our first proof by putting together Preliminary Argument 1 and Preliminary Argument 2. Bear in mind, since we are attempting to discern how it is possible for Adam to commit his first sin, we shall be assuming that Adam is still in his state of original righteousness: he is yet unfallen.

[Proof 1]
Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 2: Necessarily, Adam freely refrains from sin if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 3: God gives Adam sufficient divine grace
Premise 4: Adam’s nature is righteous
————————————————————
Conclusion 1: Therefore, Adam freely refrains from sin

You will notice that, according to the philosophy of Determinism, it is logically impossible for it to be true that “Adam freely sins” as long as it is true that “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace.” Therefore, in order for Adam to freely sin and thereby fulfill the Biblical narrative, the proposition, “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace,” must necessarily be false when it is true that “Adam freely sins.” To further demonstrate this logical necessity, let us consider some attempts to alter the preliminary arguments that form Proof 1.

To begin we shall see what happens to Proof 1 when we alter Premise 1. Specifically, we shall modify the expression “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace” to “God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace” and the logical connective from the biconditional to the conditional (that is, from “if and only if” to “if-then”) and, lastly, the modal expression “Necessarily” to “It is possible.” A note to the reader: I do not expect that everyone shall understand why these particular changes were made, but just know it was done for the purpose of presenting the altered proof as strongly as possible. Therefore our first premise for Proof 1 will now read: “It is possible, if God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace then Adam’s nature is righteous.”

[Proof 1.A]
Premise 1: It is possible, if God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace then Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 2: Necessarily, Adam freely refrains from sin if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 3: God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace
Premise 4: Adam’s nature is righteous
————————————————————
Conclusion 1.A: Therefore, Adam freely refrains from sin

The observant reader may have noticed that this argument is simply the doctrine of Pelagianism. For it asserts that it is possible for man to be righteous without the aids of sufficient divine grace. This is not only an incredible claim, it is heresy!

For our next attempt to alter Proof 1 we shall continue to assume that Adam’s nature is righteous but we shall also assume that this is concurrently true with, as per the Biblical narrative, Adam freely sinning. In making this assumption we shall be forced to alter Premise 2 from Proof 1. Specifically, we shall need to change both the expression “Adam freely refrains from sin” to “Adam freely sins” and the logical connective from the biconditional to the conditional (that is, from “if and only if” to “if-then”) and, lastly, the modal expression “Necessarily” to “It is possible.” Therefore our second premise for Proof 1 shall be: “It is possible, if Adam’s nature is righteous then Adam freely sins.”

[Proof 1.B]
Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is righteous
Premise 2: It is possible, if Adam’s nature is righteous then Adam freely sins
Premise 3: God gives Adam sufficient divine grace
Premise 4: Adam’s nature is righteous
————————————————————
Conclusion 1.B: Therefore, Adam freely sins

Whether or not it is possible for a man being given sufficient divine grace to be able to freely sin will be discussed further after we have dispensed with Determinism. For now, it is enough to say that, given Determinism, we must conclude that this modified Premise 2 cannot be a matter of mere possibility; rather, it is a matter of necessity. For the Biblical narrative tells us Adam’s nature was originally righteous, or unfallen, and that Adam in fact freely sinned. (Remember, we are assuming that Determinism is true and that having a righteous nature is compatible with freely sinning.) From this we can rewrite our modified second premise to conclude: Necessarily, if it is true “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace” and it is true that “Adam’s nature is righteous” then it logically follows that it is true “Adam freely sins.” In other words, why did Adam sin? Adam sinned because God gave him sufficient divine grace and because his nature was righteous! This, then, is unquestionably false. To be precise, the notion that God’s sufficient divine grace is capable of causing man to freely sin is the heretical doctrine commonly termed Equal Ultimacy: which says it is God’s good pleasure to actively work sin into the heart of man through the use of sufficient divine grace. But this is nothing more than a perverse interpretation of Philippians 2:13 and explicitly contradicts the Scriptures, such as, James 1:13-16.

We could certainly entertain ourselves by trying other possible combinations with the six Definitions, just for the sake of adventure, but only these two modified proofs are of any relevance for our purposes. For Adam’s nature cannot change itself: either Adam’s nature becomes fallen because God freely withholds sufficient divine grace or because Adam freely sins. But we have already established, and now logically verified, that, according to Determinism, it is not logically possible for it to be true that “Adam freely sins” as long as it is true that “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace.” Therefore, if we are to have any chance of discerning how Adam came to freely sin then we must take a closer look at what happens when we negate the claim “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace.” That is to say, we must consider what happens when it is true that “God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace.” To this end we will need to use the only remaining alternative left for us by joining together Preliminary Argument 3 and Preliminary Argument 4.

[Proof 2]
Premise 1: Necessarily, God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam’s nature is unrighteous
Premise 2: Necessarily, Adam’s nature is unrighteous if and only if Adam freely sins
Premise 3: Adam freely sins
Premise 4: Adam’s nature is unrighteous
———————
Conclusion 2: Therefore, God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace

Here is another way to make this same conclusion: “Necessarily, Adam freely sins if and only if God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace.”

[Author's note: I have provided an additional proof, Proof 2.A, in the appended symbolic logic section, in order to further verify this conclusion from Proof 2. Moreover, due to the method of my argumentation, Proof 2.A also happens to further verify the conclusion from Proof 1, namely, it is not possible, or it is necessarily not the case, God gives Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if Adam freely sins. Isn't logic a beautiful thing, the way it can show how everything is tied together?]

Although I am in danger of sounding like a broken record, I will say it again: according to the philosophy of Determinism, or more particularly, Theological Determinism, a man cannot freely will, or desire, anything that is contrary to his nature; furthermore, a man’s nature cannot change itself (it is non-volitional); and, lastly, the state of a man’s nature is dependent upon the aids of God’s sufficient divine grace.

This means we are to conclude that the only possible way for Adam to freely sin is when “God giving Adam sufficient divine grace” is false logically prior to when it is true that “Adam freely sins.” Therefore Adam did not become unrighteous in his nature because he first freely sinned but rather Adam became unrighteous in his nature because God first withheld sufficient divine grace. Therefore it was only after Adam was made unrighteous by God that Adam freely sinned. To make certain that the full and terrible implications of this doctrine do not escape the reader, notice: this is a free and sovereign act by God of monergistic regeneration (or perhaps we might call this a degeneration). For Adam’s nature, in its original uprightness, desired only to obey God and please Him continually; therefore, before Adam could freely sin, it was necessary for God to initiate a new and sinful will within Adam that was contrary to Adam’s present good nature. To providentially accomplish this it was necessary for God to withhold, or remove, that sufficient divine grace by which God was upholding and sustaining Adam in his original righteous state of nature. From this it necessarily follows that God, not man, is the author of sin, which is according to Christian orthodoxy a blasphemous thought! By author of sin I do not mean that it is blasphemy to say God has predestined man to sin. Rather I mean author of sin in the historical context as the Reformers defined it.

The Canons of Dordt, Article 15: Reprobation

Moreover, Holy Scripture most especially highlights this eternal and undeserved grace of our election and brings it out more clearly for us, in that it further bears witness that not all people have been chosen but that some have not been chosen or have been passed by in God’s eternal election– those, that is, concerning whom God, on the basis of his entirely free, most just, irreproachable, and unchangeable good pleasure, made the following decision: to leave them in the common misery into which, by their own fault, they have plunged themselves; not to grant them saving faith and the grace of conversion; but finally to condemn and eternally punish them (having been left in their own ways and under his just judgment), not only for their unbelief but also for all their other sins, in order to display his justice. And this is the decision of reprobation, which does not at all make God the author of sin (a blasphemous thought!) but rather its fearful, irreproachable, just judge and avenger.

Notice, the basis of God’s justice for leaving mankind “in the common misery into which, by their own fault, they have plunged themselves” is necessarily false, if the philosophy of Determinism is true (from Proof 1 and Proof 2). For if the philosophy of Determinism is true then mankind did not by their own fault plunge themselves into sin but God plunged (or dropped) them into sin. Therefore it necessarily follows that the philosophy of Determinism and all theological systems which are fundamentally based upon it, such as Calvinism, are incompatible to the Biblical narrative and are contrary to Christian orthodoxy because they inescapably define God as the author of sin, which is blasphemy.

Some may think they can escape this inevitable conclusion by attempting to point out that, even though God may have sovereignly withheld that sufficient divine grace from Adam, since it is only the man and not God who is actually committing the act of sin, then, therefore God cannot possibly be the author of sin. To this I reply, you are correct that it may only be the man who is actually committing the act of sin but this is irrelevant and does not escape the inevitable conclusion that the philosophy of Determinism makes God the author of sin. For consider the following analogies:

Imagine a line of dominoes which have been meticulously setup so that they will all sequentially topple each other over when the first domino piece is intentionally knocked over. Even though it is absolutely true that whosoever knocks over the first domino does not have to actively or directly knock over every other domino piece (for those will all topple over by the contingency of second causes), it still remains absolutely and necessarily true that whoever intentionally knocks over the first domino piece will have sufficiently initiated and directly caused the movement of the first domino to fall over and therefore they will be responsible for whatever consequences occur because of that act. To put this into theological perspective, even if God is not personally responsible for the continuance of man’s sinfulness, it is still inescapable that God, not man, was personally active in and responsible for the first movement of man’s heart to sin. This fact alone is sufficient to make God the author of sin.

Now, imagine a kind and loving father who intentionally and actively throws his own innocent and beloved child fatally down upon the rocks without anything in the child moving the father to do this act. Is not this kind and loving father a malicious murderer worthy of hell-fire? Indeed, he is a malicious murderer worthy of hell-fire.

Next, imagine a kind and loving father who intentionally removes his supporting hands out from under his child and thereby purposely drops his innocent and beloved child fatally down upon the rocks without any cause in the child moving the father to do this act. I ask: what is the moral difference between the father who passively withholds, or removes, the hands that uphold his innocent and beloved child and the father who actively throws his child fatally down upon the rocks? There is no difference, they are both malicious murderers worthy of hell-fire.

Notice the acts of throwing or dropping are devoid of any notion of justice. In fact, they are acts of grace, since these curses are unmerited gifts. We are left wondering: what manner of love is this? And, yet, this is exactly what Calvinism would have us to believe about God.

We can press this imagery even further. For suppose, after this malicious and murderous father has purposely thrown or dropped his innocent and beloved child fatally down upon the rocks, he kneels over the crippled, lifeless corpse and with terrible wrath and indignation curses the child for freely plunging itself fatally down upon the rocks! Is this the character of a kind, just and holy God or a mentally sick lunatic? This is undoubtedly the character of a mentally sick lunatic. Even though the method between God actively working sin into the heart of his creature or passively “dropping” the creature into sin may differ superficially in the outward appearance, the heart motive behind these acts remains the same as any malicious murderer. For this reason Deterministic predestination (e.g., Calvinism) fails to give us any meaningful understanding for the supreme justice and righteousness of God in His sovereign acts of cursing, condemnation, and reprobation. Therefore if God actually acts this way then we may rightly call the righteousness of God into dispute. Since it is blasphemous to ascribe unto God the nature of Satan. As C. S. Lewis once said, “nonsense remains nonsense even if we talk it about God.” To this we readily add that sin remains sin even if we talk it about God.

Nonetheless, some may stubbornly rebuke me, saying, “You would have us to believe that God is not completely sovereign over His creation because there is something God does not have control over!” Followed by some rhetoric about Unconditional Election and Paul’s epistle to the Romans (specifically, chapter 9). First off, this does nothing to help Determinists escape from blaspheming God. The arguments I have presented demonstrate that Determinism is strictly incompatible to the Biblical narrative and the character of God. Moreover, it is not enough to claim that we know God is truly good therefore Deterministic predestination must also be truly good, regardless of how it may appear to us—this is just circular reasoning. So, unless a proper rebuttal can be provided against the soundness of my arguments, it is a waste of time to claim that Determinism must be true in order for God to be perfectly sovereign over everything that comes to pass, including every human freewill decision. However, it is not my intention at present to address Paul’s letter to the Romans, though I would certainly love to do so. For now, I will simply assert that Romans does not teach Unconditional Election, at least not as Calvinists perceive it. However it does emphatically teach that justification is by faith in the crucified and risen Savior and not by works of the law or by being a natural descendant of Abraham. There is no disputing that God has freely and unconditionally elected those upon whom He shall have mercy, namely, the children of promise. But who are the children of promise? Paul tells us explicitly in Galatians 3:7, “therefore, be sure that it is those who are of faith who are sons of Abraham” (compare Romans 3 and Romans 9 thru 11 and Galatians 3 thru 4). If the reader would like to learn the correct hermeneutics of Romans then I have provided two excellent exegetical resources. For the convenience of the reader, both of the following links go directly to Romans 9:

Commentary on the New Testament, Intended for Popular Use: Acts-Romans by Daniel D. Whedon

A Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans by Joseph Agar Beet (1901)

Since Determinism is false, how are we to understand God’s predestination and sovereignty over human freewill decisions?

It is a common misconception and misrepresentation by Calvinists that all who reject the philosophy of Determinism are withholding from God His rightful sovereignty over human freewill decisions. It is not my intention at present to provide a full response to this objection either. Instead I will direct the inquiring reader to the works of William Lane Craig, in particular, his book, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge & Human Freedom. John Laing has also written a brief and excellent summary of this topic on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Middle Knowledge. Or, for the more ambitious reader, there is a highly technical and outstanding scholarly treatise written by Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. As far as God’s sovereignty is concerned, I will only make the following reply. Can God deny Himself or act contrary to His will and character? No, of course not (Hebrews 6:18). Is God less sovereign if He cannot or will not ever do some thing that is contrary to His will and character? Absolutely not! Why is this significant? It is important for the simple reason that it is not God’s divine sovereignty over human freewill decisions that I reject but only Determinism’s interpretation of divine sovereignty. For this is my objection against Determinism: that “God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established” (Westminster Confession, ch. 3, art. i). Therefore, God, in His sovereignty, will never bring any human freewill decision to pass after the manner of Determinism because Determinism necessarily makes God the author of sin. Therefore, just as God will never sin by denying Himself or acting contrary to His will and character, so likewise, God will never sin by acting in accordance to the teachings of Calvinism by causally determining man to freely sin. Therefore let it be fully known that I confess and glory in God’s perfect and complete sovereignty over everything that comes to pass, whether good or evil, and happily reject every interpretation and definition of divine sovereignty that is according to the unbiblical philosophy of Determinism. To this end, I reject the teachings of Calvinism to the glory of God and to the preservation of God’s holiness and the wisdom of His just acts.

So the real question, as it seems to me, is not whether God has sovereignly chosen whom He shall have mercy upon, or whom He shall reject and harden; for this He most certainly does. Rather the real question is how did an originally righteous man first come to sin and how does a totally depraved man come to believe unto salvation? What is a view of God’s sufficient divine grace and human freewill that is compatible with the Biblical narrative, a view that does not blaspheme God or fall short of the testimony of Scripture?

The answer to these questions leads us to the philosophy of Libertarianism, or, that is, the doctrine of libertarian freewill. To understand the distinction between Determinism and Libertarianism it is of utmost importance to grasp the fundamental difference between whether someone can do a thing and whether someone will do a thing. For example, the claim that “I can stand on one foot” may still be true regardless of the fact that “I never will stand on one foot.” This distinction cannot be over emphasized. For, in the philosophy of Determinism, what a man will do (e.g., “Adam freely sins”) is being causally determined by the prior state of affairs; and thus, whether a man can do otherwise (e.g., “Adam [can also] freely refrain from sin”) is either outright false or completely irrelevant (since, even if he could do otherwise, he never ever would). However, according to the philosophy of Libertarianism, the only thing being causally determined by the prior state of affairs is merely what a man can in fact do and not what he will in fact do. Therefore to encapsulate the concept of Libertarianism we must formulate a new proof. Since (a) the removal of sufficient divine grace from Adam necessarily and sufficiently causes the initial movement of Adam’s heart to sin and this sovereign act inescapably and unacceptably makes God the author of sin; and, (b) since it really is impossible for Adam’s nature to change itself (this would literally be equivalent to saying, for example, your hand has its own independent and volitional mind); therefore, we are left to conclude the only remaining alternative, (c) it must actually be possible for Adam (as a moral, volitional agent) to be capable of both freely resisting (e.g., Matthew 23:37; Acts 7:51) and freely not resisting the kind intent of God’s sufficient divine grace.

But, one might wonder, isn’t it possible that there may be only one choice that Adam could make in some circumstance? I reply that this is metaphysically impossible. We need to be careful that we do not confuse the concept of Libertarianism with what we might call Baskin-Robinism. Libertarian freedom does not require there to be 32 possible options of ice cream flavor to choose from in order for a man to make a genuinely freewill decision. It does not even require there to be an option between a minimum of two different flavors of ice cream, such as, vanilla and chocolate. All that is required is that there be at least one option, say, vanilla. Yet, when that single option of vanilla ice cream is available, it is metaphysically necessary that at the moment the man is making his decision he must be capable of either freely eating the vanilla ice cream or freely not eating the vanilla ice cream. If this were not the case then we could not say that any man who decides to eat the vanilla ice cream freely chose to do so but rather some external force compelled him to do it. But this would only make the man a mere victim of his circumstances (a likely excuse!) and not a morally culpable freewill agent, as we have already discussed. Furthermore, notice, I specifically said, when that single option is available. It is another common mistake to think that Libertarianism requires some option must always be available. This is false! So, again, in order for a human freewill decision to be genuinely free, when some act is possible for a man to do then it is necessary that it also be possible for the man to not do, or to refrain from doing, that act.

Yet merely defining the philosophy of Libertarianism will not be sufficient for our purposes. For it must also be integrated systematically into Christian Theism—we shall call this Theological Libertarianism. If the reader has not already done so, now may be beneficial to take some time to read through the blog I previously mentioned at the beginning of this article, Systematic Psychopathology. As it will exemplify from Scripture what I mean by the kind intent of God’s sufficient divine grace and that man alone, in his use of freewill, is to blame for not being converted or kept perfect by God’s sufficient divine grace. All that matters, then, is whether or not God is in fact giving Adam sufficient divine grace at the moment when Adam decides whether he will freely sin or freely refrain from sin. Therefore we can conclude that the prior state of affairs, though causally determining what Adam can in fact do, does not logically entail what Adam will in fact do.

For my explanation of how libertarian freewill is dependent upon the necessity of sufficient divine grace, I will refer the reader to the following statements.

The Five Articles of the Remonstrants

Article 3
That man does not posses saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as in his state of apostasy and sin he can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is necessary that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, and will, and all his faculties, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me you can do nothing.”

Article 4
That this grace of God is the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of all good, even to the extent that the regenerate man himself, without prevenient or assisting, awakening, following and cooperative grace, can neither think, will, nor do good, nor withstand any temptations to evil; so that all good deeds or movements that can be conceived must be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. But with respect to the mode of the operation of this grace, it is not irresistible, since it is written concerning many, that they have resisted the Holy Spirit (Acts 7, and elsewhere in many places).

The Works of James Arminius: On the Free-Will of Man

This is my opinion concerning the Free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.

It is of interest to note that Theological Libertarianism asserts that “the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of all good” in man must be ascribed to God’s sufficient divine grace. This being the case, there can be no accusations of Pelagianism or even Semi-Pelagianism. Recall, the heresy of Pelagianism is the doctrine that it is possible for man to be righteous and fulfill the law of Christ without the aids of sufficient divine grace. Whereas Semi-Pelagianism is the slightly modified teaching that at some point in time God must give man sufficient divine grace in order to begin or initiate man in the way of righteousness; but, after this, God does not need to sustain man in the continuance of the true good in order to bring it to its completion. However, Theological Libertarianism, as I have defined it, requires the aids of sufficient divine grace from the very beginning to the very end if man is ever to do what is truly good and pleasing to God, such as, acting upon justifying faith and the perseverance in faith. Therefore, in this view, it is not possible for man to be righteous at any time without God’s sufficient divine grace.

From this we are ready to define our new proof for Theological Libertarianism concerning Adam in his original state and the first sin.

[Proof 3]
Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Adam sufficient divine grace if and only if it is possible Adam freely sins or Adam freely refrains from sin
Premise 2: God gives Adam sufficient divine grace
——————
Conclusion 3: Therefore, it is possible Adam freely sins or Adam freely refrains from sin

From Proof 3 it follows that if God does in fact give Adam sufficient divine grace then Adam can freely sin and Adam can freely refrain from sin. But, how are we to logically determine whether Adam will freely sin or whether Adam will freely refrain from sin? As I mentioned previously, there is no possible way for us to logically determine which choice Adam will freely choose to do because the choice for what he will in fact do is not being caused or forced by the circumstances. From this we conclude that it is logically possible for it to be true that “Adam freely sins” in spite of, or concurrently with, it being true that “God gives Adam sufficient divine grace.” And it should be emphasized that it is because of God’s sufficient divine grace that Adam is enabled to be able to freely sin or freely refrain from sin. Nonetheless, it is still Adam (as a moral agent), by his graciously enabled freewill, who is determining for himself whether or not he will in fact freely sin. This gracious enabling of man’s freewill is known as a Prevenient Grace. It is called prevenient because it is necessary that sufficient divine grace be freely given by God prior to anything in man moving Him thereto. In other words, Prevenient Grace is an Irresistible Grace. However, by Irresistible Grace, I do not mean that this grace must necessarily bring about man’s obedience. We might put it this way: every man is irresistibly forced by God to make a choice between Life and Death; and every man is irresistibly forced to be able to choose either one or the other; but which one each man actually chooses is not irresistibly forced upon him. So, specifically, a graciously enabled freewill would be categorized as being irresistibly forced to be able to choose either Life or Death. Therefore if the man freely chooses Life by not resisting the sufficient divine grace of God then we ascribe this good in man to the sufficient divine grace alone. The reason we can ascribe this good to the grace of God alone and not to any of man’s freewill is for the same reason Reformed theologians can ascribe the true good in man to the grace of God alone. For when God makes a man willing, or enables him to freely will, to do what is pleasing in His sight then all that the man needs to do is freely not resist what God is sovereignly working within him (Philippians 2:13). This is identical to the analogy I used of standing on one foot. For imagine Adam is created standing on two feet and given the commandment to never stand on one foot: for in the day Adam stands on one foot he shall surely die! Does Adam need to freely stand on two feet before he is in fact standing on two feet? No, Adam cannot improve or add upon what God has already done or upon what God is actively doing, namely, sustaining Adam in his original state of standing on two feet. So if man’s freewill can do nothing to improve upon God’s gracious work then what can it do? It can be used to freely stand on one foot in disobedience to the commandment and God’s grace. Therefore the meaningful difference between a Libertarian and a Determinist view of divine sovereignty and human freewill is not where the true good in man comes from but rather, just as Adam demonstrated in the first sin, that it must be possible for a man who is made willing to obey God to be able to freely refrain from that obedience. And, let us not forget, just because it may be possible that a man can resist the sufficient divine grace of God does not mean we are permitted to conclude therefore man necessarily will resist. Therefore if the man does freely choose Death by resisting the sufficient divine grace of God then we rightly ascribe this sin wholly to man and not to any perverse character or lack of faithfulness in God. Furthermore, I readily grant that it is entirely possible for God to overpower the creature and force him to submit in obedience to the divine will but God has freely and sovereignly determined to never do this. For, in the beginning, among the things God declared to be good was man having a freewill. And God has seen it fit to foreordain and permit man to exercise the liberty of his freewill, even to his own destruction and just condemnation. Therefore if Adam in his original state of righteousness freely chooses to sin, as he in fact did, then, by God’s permissive will, Adam alone is morally responsible and justly blameworthy as the author of sin, not God, in strict accordance to the Biblical narrative (and the Reformed creeds and confessions for that matter). From this it follows that the philosophy of Libertarianism is Biblically compatible and the philosophy of Determinism and its offspring Calvinism are strictly unbiblical and can be safely rejected to the glory of God.

________________________________________

I have provided all of the arguments here in symbolic form in order to demonstrate their validity. This is intended to help show the structure of my arguments and clear up any potential ambiguity. Besides, there is a certain kind of aesthetic quality in it. However, if symbolic logic makes your head spin then don’t stress out about it. Since these symbolic expressions are really just repeating everything I have already said, you are free to skip this.

Since I have intentionally restricted the scope of the modal operators from every possible world to only the state of affairs in the actual world, it may be helpful if I provide a bit more precision to my usage of the following symbols:

□ means “metaphysically necessary in the actual world”
◊ means “metaphysically possible in the actual world.”

Preliminary Argument 1
  |  1. □(G ↔ R)     "Necessarily, G  iff  R"
  |  2. G
  |——————
  |  3: R            Biconditional elimination: 1, 2

Preliminary Argument 2
  |  1. □(¬S ↔ R)
  |  2. R
  |——————
  |  3: ¬S          Biconditional elimination: 1, 2

Preliminary Argument 3
  |  1. □(¬R ↔ S)
  |  2. S
  |——————
  |  3. ¬R          Biconditional elimination: 1, 2

Preliminary Argument 4
  |  1. □(¬G ↔ ¬R)
  |  2. ¬R
  |——————
  |  3. ¬G          Biconditional elimination: 1, 2

Proof 1: Theological Determinism concerning the first act of sin
  |  1. □(G ↔ R)
  |  2. □(¬S ↔ R)
  |  3. G
  |  4. R
  |——————
  |  5. ¬S          Biconditional elimination: 2, 4
  |                         *The following is for emphasis
  |    |  6. S            Assumption: "Adam freely sins"
  |    |———
  |    |  7. ⊥            Contradiction: 5, 6
  |
  |  8. ¬S          Proof by contradiction: 6-7
Therefore, we may further derive (□(G ↔ R) ↔ ¬S)) and analytically derive ¬◊(G ↔ S)

Proof 1.A: the heresy of Pelagianism
  |  1. ◊(¬G → R)
  |  2. □(¬S ↔ R)
  |  3. ¬G
  |  4. R
  |——————
  |  5. ¬S          Biconditional elimination: 2, 4

Proof 1.B: the heresy of Equal Ultimacy in virtue of being Determinism
  |  1. □(G ↔ R)
  |  2. □(R → S)       *Determinism causes ◊(R → S) to collapse into □(R → S)
  |  3. G
  |  4. R
  |——————
  |  5. S            Modus ponens: 2, 4
  |                       *The following is for emphasis
  |    |  6. G & R    Assumption: "God gives Adam sufficient divine grace"
  |    |———                            and "Adam's nature is righteous"
  |    |  7. S           Reiteration: 5
  |
  |  8. (G & R) → S     Conditional proof: 6-7

Proof 2: reconsideration of Theological Determinism concerning the first act of sin
  |  1. □(¬G ↔ ¬R)
  |  2. □(¬R ↔ S)
  |  3. S
  |  4. ¬R
  |——————
  |  5. ¬G         Biconditional elimination: 2, 4
  |                        *The following is for emphasis
  |    |  6. S           Assumption: "Adam freely sins"
  |    |———
  |    |  7. ¬R           Biconditional elimination: 2, 6
  |    |  8. ¬G           Biconditional elimination: 1, 7
  |
  |    |  9. ¬G         Assumption: "God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace"
  |    |———
  |    | 10. ¬R           Biconditional elimination: 1, 9
  |    | 11. S             Biconditional elimination: 2, 10
  |
  | 12. ¬G ↔ S     Biconditional introduction: 6-8, 9-11
Therefore, we may further derive (□(¬G ↔ ¬R) ↔ S)) and analytically derive □(¬G ↔ S)

Proof 2.A: verification of ¬◊(G ↔ S) from Proof 1 and □(¬G ↔ S) from Proof 2
  |  1. □(G ↔ R)
  |  2. □(¬S ↔ R)
  |——————
  |    |  3. S           Assumption: "Adam freely sins"
  |    |———
  |    |  4. ¬R           Tautological consequence: 2, 3
  |    |  5. ¬G           Tautological consequence: 1, 4
  |
  |    |  6. ¬G         Assumption: "God does not give Adam sufficient divine grace"
  |    |———
  |    |  7. ¬R           Tautological consequence: 1, 6
  |    |  8. S             Tautological consequence: 2, 7
  |
  |  9. ¬G ↔ S     Biconditional introduction: 3-5, 6-8

Proof 3: Theological Libertarianism concerning the first act of sin
  |  1. □(G ↔ ◊(S ∨ ¬S))     "Necessarily, G  iff  it is possible S or ¬S"
  |  2. G
  |——————
  |  3. ◊(S ∨ ¬S)     Biconditional Elimination: 1, 2