For this article I will not be defending why I hold to Theological Libertarianism. If someone were interested to know why I hold to Theological Libertarianism as the Biblical philosophy for understanding how God’s divine grace is related to human freewill decisions then please read my previous blog, Why the Philosophy of Determinism is Strictly Incompatible to the Biblical Narrative and Christian Orthodoxy. This article will be analyzing how Libertarianism integrates systematically into Christian Theism.
For my explanation of how libertarian freewill is dependent upon the necessity of sufficient divine grace, I will once again refer the reader to the following statements.
The Five Articles of the Remonstrants
Article 3
That man does not posses saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as in his state of apostasy and sin he can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is necessary that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, and will, and all his faculties, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me you can do nothing.”Article 4
That this grace of God is the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of all good, even to the extent that the regenerate man himself, without prevenient or assisting, awakening, following and cooperative grace, can neither think, will, nor do good, nor withstand any temptations to evil; so that all good deeds or movements that can be conceived must be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. But with respect to the mode of the operation of this grace, it is not irresistible, since it is written concerning many, that they have resisted the Holy Spirit (Acts 7, and elsewhere in many places).
The Works of James Arminius: On the Free-Will of Man
This is my opinion concerning the Free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.
Previously, when we were dealing with Theological Libertarianism, there was only one particular man, namely, Adam, in very particular circumstances, in the original state of righteousness, and just one action under consideration, the first sin. However, in order to discuss the possible actions of every man, the proposition, “Man freely refrains from sin,” will no longer, by itself, be robust enough for our purposes because it can only handle omissions of sin. It lacks explanatory power for dealing with many forms of truly good acts, since only some and not all omissions of sin are in fact truly good acts. For example, the positive act of believing in Christ, that is, saving faith, cannot be properly expressed as merely not committing sin. Furthermore, the positive act of refraining from certain acts of sin, such as murder, may also be accomplished by ungodly, self-righteous motives (e.g., the so-called virtuous pagan or moral heathen)—which, in this case, would mean that the very act of refraining from an act of sin is itself a sin; as it is written, “all our righteous deeds are like a filthy garment,” and, “to the pure, all things are pure; but to those who are defiled and unbelieving, nothing is pure, but both their mind and their conscience are defiled.” Nonetheless, it still remains true that this ungodly person can freely refrain from an act of sin, such as murder.
The reader may also notice that the descriptions of what a man will in fact freely do has been removed from the scope of my arguments (with the exception of a cameo appearance at the end). We shall only be concerning ourselves with what man can in fact freely do at any given moment. The reason I have limited the scope of topic to human ability and potential is because I learned very quickly that any attempt to derive the logical connections between what a man is doing (the present tense of will do), and what he can presently do becomes excessively complex.
It will be useful to briefly explain the nature of “can” and how it relates to human freewill potential. To demonstrate, let us use a simple analogy about walking. (We shall assume that walking sideways is impossible.) Each of the following propositions are distinctly different, even if subtly so.
(1) “I can walk forward.”
(2) “I can’t walk forward.”
(3) “I can refrain from walking forward.”
(4) “I can’t refrain from walking forward.”
The first claim is straight-forward enough: there is something that I can do, namely, walking forward. But notice how saying that (2) I cannot do something is not the same as saying (3) I can not do something. For the second claim, (2), implies that there is some hindrance or barrier making it literally impossible to do something—it simply can’t be done. Whereas the third claim, (3), implies that I really can do something but it also just so happens that I can also refrain from doing, or I can simply not do, that thing.
The fourth claim, (4), is a little different. For it can be interpreted in different ways. For instance, if we interpret this through Determinism then it implies that there is some sort of irresistible mind compulsion at work that is literally making it impossible for me to refrain from doing something—I can’t not do that thing. Mind you, this is more than a mere physical force; this is more than someone grabbing you by the arm and forcing your hand to slap your own face. This is also more than a mere allurement or enticement to do something. For this is an external force of some kind that is causing an internal compulsion upon the human volition, think Jedi mind-control: when an independent, external entity is forcefully causing a person’s mind to think certain thoughts or do certain things against or in place of that person’s own present will. This is exactly how Theological Determinism operates. William Lane Craig puts it like this, “God could [irresistibly] force everyone to repent and be saved by overpowering their wills, but that would be a sort of divine rape, not their being freely saved. It’s logically impossible to make someone do something freely. So long as God desires free creatures, then, even He cannot guarantee that all will freely embrace His salvation” (Craig, Politically Incorrect Salvation). I will interpret the fourth claim about being unable to refrain from doing something through the lens of Libertarianism in a moment.
Moreover, the following four propositions are also distinctly different.
(5) “I can walk backward.”
(6) “I can’t walk backward.”
(7) “I can refrain from walking backward.”
(8) “I can’t refrain from walking backward.”
However, in order to make our set complete we would then need to make another assortment of eight more expressions to represent the variations for what a man will do; for example, “I am walking forward” and “I am walking backward” and “I am refraining from walking forward,” etc. Bringing us up to 16 statements that would all need to be included and pieced together to show how each is logically connected to the others. Fun stuff, but excessively complex. And it gets trickier yet when we start throwing in the doctrines of justification and sin, and so on. So we will make this as easy as is reasonable for ourselves and just stick to the eight variations of what a man can do.
So, let us begin setting down the definitions we shall be using to form the argument for Theological Libertarianism. If the reader has seen my previous blog, they will notice some significant changes have been made to some of the following definitions.
Note: I will be using Man as a generic label for any morally culpable person that may exist at any given time.
Definition 1: (F2) “Man can freely do a truly good act” — to be able to do what is good and pleasing to God; to be capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace. For example, to act upon justifying, saving faith or to be able to endure, or escape from, temptation with godly motives (1 Corinthians 10:13-14).
Definition 2: (¬F2) “Man cannot freely do a truly good act” — it is impossible to be able to do what is good and pleasing to God. There are certain circumstances under which God gives a man over to the impurity of his own heart: when God does not extend sufficient divine grace to him. Whether God permits this for a time and a season or unto the man’s death is God’s just and sovereign prerogative. During this time of judgment, or “passing over,” Theological Libertarianism tells us that man remains genuinely free (recall, Libertarianism does not require that an option always be available to a person in order for them to make genuine freewill decisions). Nonetheless, since man is necessarily dependent upon sufficient divine grace in order for truly good acts to be available to him; since he “does not posses saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as in his state of apostasy and sin he can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good”; therefore, during this time of judgment, man cannot freely do any truly good acts; yet, he remains genuinely free to do any act of sin he desires, insofar as they are available to him (this is me not so subtly hinting to what is commonly known as restraining grace). In other words, since, even if God were giving him sufficient divine grace, the man would continue to freely sin; therefore, when God withholds sufficient divine grace from the man, God is still not forcing or violating the man’s will. In fact, God is merely giving the man exactly what he wants.
Definition 3: (F4) “Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act” — this is always the case, with one possible exception: there may be certain circumstances in heaven that make it impossible for man to refrain from doing some truly good act. As it is written, James 4:17, “to one who knows the right thing to do and does not do it, to him it is sin”; see also, 1 John 3:17). Thus, if one in heaven knows that something is the right thing to do then they cannot freely refrain from doing that thing without committing an act of sin; therefore, they will always freely do that truly good act. However, this does not necessarily mean that man’s freewill in heaven shall be without a variety of opportunities and methods for accomplishing such an act.
Definition 4: (¬F4) “Man cannot freely refrain from doing a truly good act” — while it is true that this claim may be interpreted as portraying Determinism; it is also true that this may be interpreted as accurately portraying the state of man in heaven. For the Bible tells us quite clearly that there will be no sinning in heaven. It seems more likely to me that man cannot sin in heaven for the simple reason that man will not ever refrain from doing those things that are truly good in heaven. But, when it comes to immutable states, it is impossible to logically determine the priorities of cannot from can not; that is to say, it is impossible to logically determine whether a person doesn’t do something because of a genuine inability or because of an ability never acted upon. All things being equal, however, if for whatever reason the act of sinning is an unavailable option to choose from in heaven then Theological Libertarianism still remains true. Likewise, we may say the same concerning those in hell who cannot and will not ever refrain from the free act of hating God.
Definition 5: (S2) “Man can freely do an act of sin” — simply, a man is freely able to disobey God’s commandment, resist sufficient divine grace (2 Corinthians 6:1), and act contrary to God’s nature (1 John 2:16) and the original image man was created in.
Definition 6: (¬S2) “Man cannot freely do an act of sin” — this is only possible, if ever, in heaven; see Definition 4.
Definition 7: (S4) “Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin” — this is always metaphysically possible, with one exception, as it seems to me: those in hell who cannot and will not ever refrain from freely hating God. As I previously explained, even the ungodly can freely refrain from doing certain acts of sin whenever they so choose.
Definition 8: (¬S4) “Man cannot freely refrain from doing an act of sin” — this is metaphysically impossible, with one exception: those in hell who cannot and will not ever refrain from freely hating God.
Definition 9: (G) “God gives Man sufficient divine grace” — by sufficient divine grace, I am specifically referring to that prevenient or assisting, awakening, following and cooperative grace which is necessary and sufficient for man to remain in his original state of righteousness, to be converted from a state of total depravity, to be kept from sin and preserved in the way of salvation.
Definition 10: (¬G) “God does not give Man sufficient divine grace” — you get the idea.
Definition 11: (R) “Man is righteous” — to be upright or unfallen; to be judicially declared or imputed as not guilty and innocent by God through justifying, saving faith; to be a child of God, at peace with God. Notice I have removed “nature” from this expression in order to make this a catch-all phrase for any kind of Christ-centered righteousness that may be applicable to man. It is important that the reader does not confuse this with the righteousness or unrighteousness of an act. For example, it is possible for a Christian to freely commit an act of sin while still remaining righteous. This is because they are being justified by an enduring, even if weak, faith in Christ. In other words, unlike Adam, a Christian’s righteousness is not his own but it is the righteousness of God in Christ being imputed to him. While this is by no means a license to sin, it is a testimony to God’s abounding kindness and patience towards us.
Definition 12: (¬R) “Man is unrighteous” — to be fallen and sinful, not upright; to be without justifying, saving faith; to be a child of the Devil and under God’s wrath.
Now, we are ready to derive the premises to form a more complete proof for Theological Libertarianism.
Premise 1: Necessarily, if Man is righteous then God gives Man sufficient divine grace
I take this premise to be axiomatic, that is, self-evident. For it is not possible for man to be righteous or to please God at any time without the aids of sufficient divine grace. Remember, as I have defined it, to be righteous could indicate either man in his original state prior to the first sin or it could indicate a sinner who has been justified, awakened and regenerated by the Holy Spirit or, lastly, those who have entered into the eternal state of glory.
As mentioned previously, merely refraining from sin does not always constitute a truly good and righteous act. For this reason we can no longer get away with speaking of sinning and refraining from some act of sin as though these were always logical opposites—this relation is only consistent when man is in his original state of nature before the first sin. From this point on, we will have to be more precise and speak of being able to do what is truly sinful, that is, an act of sin, as opposed to being able to do what is truly good, that is, doing what is pleasing to God. Thus,
Premise 2: Necessarily, God gives Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is possible Man can freely do an act of sin or Man can freely do a truly good act
From Premise 1, when a man is righteous it is necessary that it also be true God is giving him sufficient divine grace; in other words, it is not possible for God to withhold sufficient divine grace from a righteous man because God has sworn by His own holiness to be faithful to and bless those who love Him (1 Corinthians 10:13-14 and many other places). However, when a man is unrighteous, that is, when a man by his own fault is in a damnable state, it is not necessary for God to bless him by extending sufficient divine grace and mercy to that man. For when a man is unrighteous then it is God’s free and sovereign prerogative alone (Romans 9:16) to either graciously extend mercy to that unrighteous man or to curse that man and bring about his just destruction at the time of God’s own choosing; as it is written in Ezekiel 18, 33, 36 and Jeremiah 18 and many, many other places. Fortunately, God in his compassion has freely chosen to extend sufficient divine grace to all mankind and in His justice to withhold it only from those who refuse to repent and believe in His Name (Luke 6:27-36; John 3:16-18; 1 John 2:2). Therefore, since it is only possible for a man to be cursed by God if that man is first an unrighteous sinner,
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man is unrighteous if and only if it is possible God gives Man sufficient divine grace or God does not give Man sufficient divine grace
In the event that God determines to freely withhold sufficient divine grace from a man then it is necessary that this man first be unrighteous and thereby worthy of being cursed; lest God should be the author of sin, as the Bible says. And it necessarily follows that if God has given a man over to the lusts of his fallen, depraved nature then that man will freely continue in sin, and that perpetually. Moreover, if man will freely continue in sin then it obviously follows that he can freely sin. And, lastly, since man is necessarily dependent upon the aids of sufficient divine grace in order to ever do anything that is truly good, it also follows that, during this time of hardening, this man cannot possibly do anything that is truly good.
Premise 4: Necessarily, God does not give Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is necessary Man is unrighteous and Man can freely do an act of sin and Man cannot freely do a truly good act
Lastly, It will always be true, while in this world, that a man can freely refrain from committing a truly good act and that a man can always freely refrain from committing an act of sin. For example, when God is not giving a man sufficient divine grace, it is impossible for that man to actually do a truly good act; nonetheless, it still remains true that the man can freely refrain from committing a truly good act. And, again, even the ungodly can freely refrain from certain acts of sin, even though everything they do is ultimately sinful. Therefore,
Premise 5: Necessarily, Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act and Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
I have opted to make three separate proofs: one for Theological Libertarianism before the first death, another for the life to come in eternal glory and a third for the second death in eternal torment. Had I not done this then I would’ve had to add all kinds of intricate qualifiers, such as, “Man is in a glorified state” or “Man is justified by faith,” etc. So, having set forth these definitions and properly arranged them, without further ado, for the viewing pleasure of the reader, I present the following expanded formulation for Theological Libertarianism of what man can do while in this present world.
[Proof for Theological Libertarianism: what man can do while in this present world]
Premise 1: Necessarily, if Man is righteous then God gives Man sufficient divine grace
Premise 2: Necessarily, God gives Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is possible Man can freely do an act of sin and Man can freely do a truly good act
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man is unrighteous if and only if it is possible God gives Man sufficient divine grace or God does not give Man sufficient divine grace
Premise 4: Necessarily, God does not give Man sufficient divine grace if and only if it is necessary Man is unrighteous and Man can freely do an act of sin and Man cannot freely do a truly good act
Premise 5: Necessarily, Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act and Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
——————
Conclusion 1: …
I will draw your attention to notice that I did not provide any particular conclusion since I did not specify which man is in view or which circumstances apply to this man. Moreover, I have minimized the number of premises and logical connections that could’ve been made in order to highlight what I find to be the most significant points of interest, while still covering as many potentials as possible, and I have left the rest for the reader to discern. (Enjoy!) For example, I take it for granted that the reader has discerned from my explanations that if God is not giving sufficient divine grace then it is impossible for man to be able to freely refrain from the particular act of hating God, even though he can freely refrain from other acts of sin. Furthermore, objectively speaking, from God’s point-of-view, whenever a man is outright, willfully hating God then, by implication, this man ultimately hates his neighbor and loves sin. I also take it for granted that the reader is capable of intuitively determining how what a man will do is related to what he can do.
For these last two arguments, I will be pretty much skipping straight to the finished proofs, since everything has already been sufficiently touched upon. Although, I will be forced to add a few somewhat peripheral definitions in order to properly present the relevant matter.
Definition 13: (E) “there are other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision” — I made a brief reference to this earlier; see Definition 3. By opportune acts, I simply mean any variety of truly good acts that is pleasing to God, given the circumstances.
Definition 14: (¬E) “there are not other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision” — this seems to me a highly unlikely scenario, but I can think of no good reason to eliminate it. It is at least logically possible that there may be some circumstance in heaven for which there is only one possible method to accomplishing some particular goal. Perhaps such an act might be the act of loving God; for while there are certainly many fruits of love, there is only one foundational root.
And, for these final proofs, even though I tried to keep away from including what a man will do in these proofs, it just seemed to be lacking without it. But these definitions should be quite familiar from my previous article and really need no explaining.
Definition 15: (¬S) “Man will freely not commit an act of sin“
Proof for Theological Libertarianism: in eternal glory (i.e., heaven)
Premise 1: Necessarily, God gives Man sufficient divine grace and Man is righteous and Man can freely do a truly good act and Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
Premise 2: It is possible, Man can freely refrain from doing a truly good act if and only if there are other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man cannot freely refrain from doing a truly good act if and only if there are not other opportune acts available to choose from at the moment of decision
Premise 4: Necessarily, Man will freely not commit an act of sin
——————
Conclusion 2: Therefore, [whatever else we may conclude,] necessarily, Man will freely not commit an act of sin
Note: By Premise 2 and Premise 3, my intention is to indicate the distinction between a goal to be accomplished and the act or manner in which it is done. For example, let us say someone has a genuine need for food: 1 John 3:17, “whoever has the world’s goods, and sees his brother in need and closes his heart against him, how does the love of God abide in him?” We are not necessitated to give this person a particular type of food, since we could give them any number of different edibles. Moreover, we don’t have to actually give them any food at all, since we could also give some money for them to buy food. Therefore, we are free to accomplish this goal (which would otherwise be a sin for us to refrain from doing) in several opportune ways at the moment we are deciding to help our neighbor. But I suppose there may be certain goals that can only be accomplished in one specific way.
Definition 16: (S) “Man will freely commit an act of sin“
Proof for Theological Libertarianism: in eternal torment (i.e., hell)
Premise 1: Necessarily, God does not give Man sufficient divine grace and Man is unrighteous and Man cannot freely do a truly good act and Man can freely do an act of sin
Premise 2: It is possible, Man can freely refrain from doing an act of sin
Premise 3: Necessarily, Man will freely commit an act of sin
——————
Conclusion 3: Therefore, [whatever else we may conclude,] necessarily, Man will freely commit an act of sin
Note: for Premise 2 and Premise 3 of this final proof, remember to keep in mind the distinction between the act of refraining and the act that has been refrained from.
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Proof for Theological Libertarianism: what man can do while in this present world | 1. □(R → G) | 2. □(G ↔ ◊(S2 & F2)) | 3. □(¬R ↔ ◊(G ∨ ¬G)) | 4. □(¬G ↔ □(¬R & S2 & ¬F2)) | 5. □(F4 & S4) |—————— | Proof for Theological Libertarianism: in eternal glory (i.e., heaven) | 1. □(G & R & F2 & S4) | 2. ◊(F4 ↔ E)) | 3. □(¬F4 ↔ ¬E)) | 4. □¬S |—————— | 5. □¬S Proof for Theological Libertarianism: in eternal torment (i.e., hell) | 1. □(¬G & ¬R & ¬F2 & S2) | 2. ◊S4 | 3. □S |—————— | 5. □S
