I have been thinking about something and I would very much like to hear someone explain whether or not they think the following narrative is necessarily false and why.
God possesses Libertarian freedom. Therefore a rational Christian will not dispute that Libertarian freedom is logically coherent and metaphysically possible. For example, God was neither pre-necessitated nor efficiently caused by any prior state of affairs or by anything external to His own freewill to create the universe. Libertarian freedom requires that when and if it is possible to do some act then it is metaphysically necessary that it also be possible to refrain from doing that act (e.g., if God can create the universe then God can also refrain from creating the universe). God decides that Libertarian freedom will be part of the image and likeness of Himself that will be created in man. God creates a man, Adam, and declares what He has made to be “good.” Since this creaturely endowment of Libertarian freedom is declared by God to be “good,” God further determines that He shall not remove, usurp, violate, or otherwise finagle with this gracious and intrinsically valuable gift. Since Adam is created upright, without sin or defect, he is necessarily capable of this specific act: Adam can freely will to obey God’s commandment. Moreover, Adam knows that it is right and good to obey God’s commandment. However, since Adam can freely will to obey God’s commandment, it is necessarily and concurrently true that Adam can freely will to refrain from obeying God’s commandment.
So we have these two necessary and concurrently true propositions:
( A) Adam can freely will to obey God’s commandment
(~A) Adam can freely will to refrain from obeying God’s commandment.
It is important to notice that, for Adam, refraining from obeying God’s commandment just is committing the first act of sin (James 4:17).
Furthermore, God, in His omniscience, knows that if Adam is placed into the circumstances of the Biblical narrative then Adam would freely will to refrain from obeying God’s commandment. God decides to place Adam into the circumstances of the Biblical narrative. Adam, being placed into the circumstances of the Biblical narrative, exercises his Libertarian power of self-determination, or power of contrary choice, and decides that the motive to freely will to refrain from obeying God’s commandment is more desirable than the motive to freely will to obey God’s commandment. Therefore, since Adam was neither pre-necessitated nor efficiently caused by any prior state of affairs or by anything external to his own freewill to sin, Adam, as a self-causational and volitional agent (or “unmoved mover”), efficiently causes himself to will to commit the first act of sin instead of continuing in obedience to God’s commandment.
To summarize:
(1) Adam was irresistibly and providentially forced by God to make a choice between obedience and disobedience to God’s commandment.
(2) Adam was irresistibly and providentially forced by God to be capable of freely willing to will to do either act.
(3) Adam was NOT irresistibly or providentially forced by God to freely will to do one act and not the other.
(4) And, lastly, because of (3), given the exact same prior state of affairs in the Biblical narrative, it is genuinely possible that Adam could have freely willed to refrain from committing the first act of sin. If Adam had refrained from committing the first act of sin then God would have foreknown this instead.
If anyone agrees with what I have presented here then know that I have set forth the Arminian/Molinist account of Adam’s first act of sin. If anyone finds this narrative disagreeable then, I ask, is it possible to prove how or why this, or some part of this, is necessarily false in a non-circular argument?
John Ferrer
June 9, 2011 at 10:30 pm
Jordan, I think we agree on most of the account. I’m certainly not very Calvinist on this issue. But neither am I a Molinist. I affirm libertarian freedom but only in a qualified sense because I also affirm that God is timelessly eternal and in some sense “unbound” by time such that he knows all past, present, and future events from a position of eternal “now.” Given that tenet, God knows everything we will freely do, but I contend that we are still free in doing what we do.
With respect to Time, yes, Adam can freely will to sin or not sin (libertarian freedom). With respect to eternity, no, Adam cannot do anything other than what he eventually chooses to do (no-libertarian freedom). I contend that the relevant commonality between these is not “power of contrary choice” but rather, agency–the sufficient causal power of the individual. Adam was the efficient cause of his own sin. No matter what causal forces preceded him, he was the immediate, efficient, intelligent, active, willful cause, and therefore the morally culpable party in his sin. That’s in fact why we can call it “his” sin.
These two senses of libertarian and non-libertarian free will are not contradictions since their conflict has two reference points, ie: two senses. To illustrate. I do not both exist and not-exist, but in the eyes of my wife I very much exist, and in the eyes of my middle-school crush, I never existed at all. Two different senses, and so those two options: existing and not-existing can be true as long as there are two different reference points/senses.
I contend that both can be true without conceding to conventional libertarianism (ie: power of contrary choice), at least not with respect to eternity, since Adam only had a choice with respect to time; and without conceding to determinism, since God’s prior causal activity in bringing Adam into existence may have also included a gifting of genuinely autonomous will, ie: agency, where Adam can produce some of his own desires and actions without coercion. To say that God could not do such a thing as create agents is to restrict God’s omnipotence with a non-logically-contradictory boundary, hence God is no longer omnipotent.
Moreover, Molinism doesn’t help much even though it puts our choices outside of God’s coercion. Those choices are likewise outside of our selection too since they are already made for us in a pre-creation realm before there’s any actual “us” around. Best I can tell, Molinists have no concensus nor much of an answer at all on what exactly does ground/determine our choices in that “middle” realm (Middle knowledge–of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom).
Are those “woulds” of our “Free” behavior just “basic” truths? (then our choices are predetermined like laws of nature, and thus not significantly free)
Are they “chosen” by a preexistent “us”? (If so, that’s a brand of the pre-existent soul heresy that Augustine abandoned later in his career, and that got Origen in trouble for never abandoning it).
Are they created by something besides God? (That is no longer monotheism)
Are they created by God, say as ideas of his or as a prior realm before this one? (If so, then that’s not molinism, that’s just traditional Creation Doctrine with free knowledge and natural knowledge).
so, in conclusion, I see no compelling reason to appeal to “Possible worlds” in a Molinist account, nor strong reason to affirm a strong libertarian view, deterministic view, or compatibilist view (since that’s just an inflated version of determinism), since agent-determinism and traditional classical creation doctrine satisfies.
Jordan Fishel
June 9, 2011 at 11:36 pm
Thanks for commenting, John!
You are making a fundamental modal fallacy here: “With respect to Time, yes, Adam can freely will to sin or not sin (libertarian freedom). With respect to eternity, no, Adam cannot do anything other than what he eventually chooses to do (no-libertarian freedom).”
What you ought to have said is, “with respect to eternity (or God’s foreknowledge) Adam WILL not do anything other than what he eventually chooses to do.” This is still libertarian freedom. Be careful that you do not make the categorical mistake of assuming future events are just like past events, which are hard facts. Just because something will inevitably happen does not mean it necessarily must happen and therefore all possible alternatives inexplicably vanish in a puff of logic. So this tension between what is in time and what is timeless really is an ad hoc conceptualization that is a contradiction. You are just restating the Fatalist’s modal fallacy. This should become evident when you strip away this subjective/relative perspective you have suggested and replace it with a purely objective view of all events. After all, the only sense of time that ultimately matters is the one God has predestined. Therefore we are either left with the conceptualization that (1) all events are necessitated or (2) human freewill decision are not necessitated and God knows every human freewill decision that will inevitably occur. In (2) we have predestination and inevitability and libertarian human freedom.
Concerning the grounding objection: I will not even begin to attempt a discussion on the grounding objection; that is, the truth value of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. I shall leave that to the experts: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Middle Knowledge, the works of William Lane Craig (such as his book, The Only Wise God), and Thomas P. Flint’s book, Divine Providence: A Molinist Account. Surprisingly, Wikipedia also has some good references, such as the following quotations,
“The grounding objection “asserts that there are no true counterfactuals about how creatures would freely act under any given set of circumstances. This assertion is no mere ostensibly undercutting defeater of Molinism, but a putatively rebutting defeater. It makes a bold and positive assertion and therefore requires warrant in excess of that which attends the Molinist assumption that there are true counterfactuals about creaturely free actions.” Later, Craig points out “Anti–Molinists have not even begun the task of showing that counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are members of the set of propositions or statements which require truth–makers if they are to be true.” Thus the grounding objector must prove a universal negative regarding the falsity of counterfactuals of freedom or she must explain her theory of the basis for truth and prove that theory true.”
So, as for the grounding objection, it holds no water.
You also said, “Are they created by God, say as ideas [...]? (If so, then that’s not molinism, that’s just traditional Creation Doctrine with free knowledge and natural knowledge).”
Negatory. Middle knowledge serves a very important role in mediating between God’s natural knowledge and His free knowledge. I would highly recommend reading the resources I have linked for you to learn more about it. What it primarily boils down to is that if God has determined all future human freewill decisions by His free knowledge then God is the author of sin. For God’s free knowledge is incapable of handling counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. This is not satisfactory.
You also said, “Moreover, Molinism doesn’t help much even though it puts our choices outside of God’s coercion. Those choices are likewise outside of our selection too since they are already made for us in a pre-creation realm before there’s any actual ‘us’ around. ”
Now, by “our choices” do you mean the choices we shall actually make or the alternative choices that are available for us to make at any given moment? Again, our future freewill choices are not hard facts just because God foreknows them or because God has created the world in which we make the choices that we do.
Ryan Fishel
June 11, 2011 at 3:24 am
I haven’t studied the topics enough to follow all the key terms, key concepts, and know the details of the various arguments go. But a thought:
If God is a “Libertarian” (not sure of all that entails), that does not mean when He made us in His image we are now littl’ libertarians. It could. But not necessarily. There are in the Godhead communicable and incommunicable attributes.
And it seems from Scripture, that man perhaps has some form of finite “Libertarianism” (again, not such of the implications of that term), but if God’s “Libertarianism” is infinite, then there could be times when by sheer power of will He could rule over ours. Why not? 2 Chronicles 10:15; 18:22; 25:20.
(And if God by doing those things voids the “libertarian” aspect of Libertarianism… Then perhaps we’re not Libertarians.)
Jordan Fishel
June 11, 2011 at 7:27 am
Ryan! Always good to see your interest in learning.
You said, “If God is a ‘Libertarian’ (not sure of all that entails), that does not mean when He made us in His image we are now littl’ libertarians. It could. But not necessarily.”
I’ll address your usage of “Libertarian” in a moment. Otherwise, you are absolutely correct. I never said, nor do I hold, that it was necessary for God to create man with libertarian freedom. Indeed, it was not even necessary for God to create man in the first place. But, it is possible, since God did create man in His image and likeness, that libertarian freedom was included in that image. (Note: it is not currently necessary for me to prove that God actually gives man libertarian freedom, since the purpose of this particular blog is for others to show why it is false. In other words, the burden of proof is not mine until someone can provide an argument demonstrating that man possessing libertarian freedom is not possible in the actual world.)
You said, “There are in the Godhead communicable and incommunicable attributes.”
Correct, again. The question remains, however. Is libertarian freedom an incommunicable divine attribute? To be quite honest, I have no idea how one might go about attempting to prove that libertarian freedom is an incommunicable divine attribute.
Finally, you said, “And it seems from Scripture, that man perhaps has some form of finite “Libertarianism” (again, not [sure] of the implications of that term), but if God’s “Libertarianism” is infinite, then there could be times when by sheer power of will He could rule over ours. Why not? 2 Chronicles 10:15; 18:22; 25:20.”
Before we get into the answer for this, let’s go over some of the basics. Libertarianism is not synonymous with freewill; it is a type or quality of freewill. This is why we will use phrases such as “libertarian freedom” or “libertarian freewill.” The libertarian aspect of freewill is what is known as the power of contrary choice. Here is one way we might express this kind of freedom: if it is possible I can do some act (fill in the blank) then necessarily I can also refrain from doing that act.
In the blog I used the example that “if God can create the universe then God can also refrain from creating the universe.” Or, another example, if it is possible for me to jump on one foot then it is also possible for me to not jump on one foot. Freewill is what determines whether I will in fact jump on one foot or not jump on one foot. Whereas libertarian freedom is what determines that I am actually able to do both of these acts.
So when you speak of “finite Libertarianism” and “infinite Libertarianism” this is an erroneous usage of terms. Libertarianism is always finite, specifically, it is always a pair; it only comes in twos (like the above examples: I can A therefore I can also refrain from A). Therefore what you are really trying to say is something very different. So let me do some rephrasing (please, let me know if I make any incorrect substitutions) and then I will dissect what is being said.
If God is sovereign over human libertarian freedom then it is possible there could be times when by sheer power of will God could remove that libertarian freedom.
First off, this is a single claim, not an argument. So, let me put this into argument form.
P1: If God is sovereign over human libertarian freedom then it is possible there could be times when by sheer power of will God could remove that libertarian freedom.
P2: God is sovereign over human libertarian freedom.
———-
C: Therefore, it is possible there could be times when by sheer power of will God could remove that libertarian freedom.
Okay, now we have an argument to work with. Obviously, it is neither necessary that God gives man libertarian freedom nor is it necessary that God sustains man with libertarian freedom. However, what evidence do we actually have to support (a) libertarian freedom is an incommunicable divine attribute or (b) God has not given man libertarian freedom or (c) God has determined to sometimes remove libertarian freedom from man? While it is true that you have provided some excellent Scripture references for us to consider, it is also very, very important to recognize that these verses must first be interpreted before we can make any conclusions as to whether or not they actually support any of these claims. As William Lane Craig puts this, “[T]he point is that even the Calvinist, you see, is doing more than just exegesis. He is giving a philosophical interpretation to the data of Scripture that goes beyond Scripture when he appeals to universal divine causal determinism.” In other words, these passages, strictly speaking, tell us nothing about whether God is causally determining these people to act as they do or whether God is bringing about these events through some other means (such as Libertarianism and divine middle knowledge).
I will not be addressing the particular passages you have suggested; instead, I have another verse that will perfectly demonstrate how to interpret these passages from 2 Chronicles and all of those verses just like them.
2 Samuel 12:9. Nathan the prophet, speaking to King David, “Why have you despised the word of the LORD by doing evil in His sight? You have struck down Uriah the Hittite with the sword …”
Wait a minute … so, did David actually smite Uriah with a sword? No, he didn’t. So, either the OT writer was extremely confused or there is something else being indicated here. The inspired writers were certainly never confused; in fact, this kind of figurative description was used all the time to identify responsibility, intent, and purpose. For example, even though David did not actually slay Uriah, David did make certain that Uriah was put into the circumstances that inevitably led to his death. This is identical to what is being said in 2 Chronicles 10:15 and 18:22 and 25:20 (and all those similar passages). In other words, God providentially put those people into specific circumstances that He knew would inevitably lead to those people freely deciding to do what they did. And this is how God can fully accomplish His will through libertarian freedom.
So, while it is true that God is sovereign over human libertarian freedom and I readily grant that God is more than capable of overpowering man’s will, removing his libertarian freedom, and necessitating him to do whatsoever the Lord desires, there is, however, no biblical support that God ever does any of this unless we assume that Determinism is true before we ever even read the passages of Scripture (which is just circular reasoning); and, furthermore, there is no biblical evidence to support even the very notion that Determinism must ever be true in order for God to get man to do exactly what He wants him to. Therefore, since Theological Libertarianism does not abuse or contradict any of these sovereignty passages, we have no good reason to think that God, in His sovereignty, has ever taken libertarian freedom away from man.
—–
P.S.
In response to your last comment: “And if God by doing those things voids the “libertarian” aspect of Libertarianism… Then perhaps we’re not Libertarians.” This is actually a non-sequitur (a fancy way for saying, “this doesn’t follow”). Even if it were the case that God sometimes voided the libertarian aspect of freewill then it would only follow that sometimes we’re not libertarianly free. Libertarianism would have to be always false before we could truly not be “Libertarians.”
Ryan Fishel
June 11, 2011 at 2:54 pm
Jordan, you’ve stated: “God providentially put those people into specific circumstances that He knew would inevitably lead to those people freely deciding.”
So the person didn’t have a choice in being put into the situation. But they did, then, get to choose their actions. Like a light switch?
Jordan Fishel
June 11, 2011 at 5:15 pm
As I summarized at the end of the blog:
(1) Adam was irresistibly and providentially forced by God to make a choice between obedience and disobedience (or refraining from obedience) to God’s commandment.
(2) Adam was irresistibly and providentially forced by God to be capable of freely willing to will to do either act.
(3) Adam was NOT irresistibly or providentially forced by God to freely will to do one act and not the other.
(4) And, lastly, because of (3), given the exact same prior state of affairs in the Biblical narrative, it is genuinely possible that Adam could have freely willed to refrain from committing the first act of sin. If Adam had refrained from committing the first act of sin then God would have foreknown this instead.
You said, “So the person didn’t have a choice in being put into the situation.”
This is not a simple statement to respond to. Sometimes this is true and sometimes not. The answer will depend on what we mean by “the situation.” Does man have a choice in whether or not he is in the situation of being human? Obviously not. For other things we do have a choice, such as, whether we shall go places or do certain things. Nonetheless, the consequences of our actions we have no choice in determining, those are beyond our power to control. For example, I can make the choice of putting myself in the situation of walking down the street. But I do not make the choice for whether, while walking down the street, the “tower in Siloam” falls on my head.
You asked, “But they did, then, get to choose their actions. Like a light switch?
It is never quite adequate to use impersonal and inanimate objects to describe human freewill. However, suppose the light switch actually possesses libertarian freedom. The light switch does not decide whether it will be placed into the ON or OFF position; but, it can determine for itself whether it will actually turn on or off.
Here is a quick overview for how we might see this. For whatever reason, God wants a world in which Adam freely sins. Therefore …
God intentionally creates Adam and Eve with a certain kind of nature and places them in the garden of Eden. God intentionally creates a certain tree and makes a certain commandment regarding man’s relation to that tree. God intentionally casts Satan out of heaven and down upon the earth. God knows that if Satan is free to wander the earth then eventually he will decide to seek out man and find them. God knows that Satan is so crafty that he will be able to deceive Eve into choosing to eat of that forbidden tree. God knows that if Eve decides to eat of the forbidden tree then Adam will also decide (for whatever reason of his own devising) to also eat of that forbidden tree.
So everything regarding human nature, the place and time of their births (or creation), certain aspects of the environment, the fact that Satan was put there, and the commandment of God were all beyond human freewill to control. But, what Adam and Eve (and even Satan for that matter, if angels/demons also possess libertarian freedom) would do given these circumstances remained within their own power to determine for themselves (e.g., whether they would walk to the forbidden tree or whether they would actually eat or not eat from it).
Ryan Fishel
June 11, 2011 at 11:53 pm
Here’s the problem. Calvinist believe in freewill. They believe we choose to make decisions; we’re responsible for every one. Read Calvin, the Puritans, Spurgeon, MacArthur or Piper. All people have a will and can sin. Do sin. What people can’t choose, being totally deprave, is Jesus as Saviour and Lord. People are the authors of their sin. And God is the author of their salvation. 100%. That is the issue. Though when it comes to talking about Satan, or Adam and Eve, the talks can get a bit tricky and debated. But the real issue we deal with on a daily basis is not Adam and Eve, but fall’s consequences of original sin.
Thus, does Libertarian freewill mean now man can magically choose a holy God over a sin soaked self?
Jordan Fishel
June 12, 2011 at 2:21 am
“[D]oes Libertarian freewill mean now man can magically choose a holy God over a sin soaked self?”
I have already addressed this elsewhere. The answer is a resounding “NO!” Libertarianism, or more specifically, Theological Libertarianism, says that when and if it is possible for man to do some act, etc. However, truly good acts, such as saving faith and repentance from dead works, are only possible when God preveniently and graciously enables man by the workings of the Holy Spirit to be able to do truly good acts (John 15:5; Phil. 2:12-13). So, there is nothing magical about libertarian freedom, it is not Pelagianism or even Semi-Pelagianism.
Here are the quotations I like to reference to state the Libertarian doctrine on man’s complete and utter dependency upon the divine grace of God for all good in him.
The Five Articles of the Remonstrants
Article 3
That man does not posses saving grace of himself, nor of the energy of his free will, inasmuch as in his state of apostasy and sin he can of and by himself neither think, will, nor do any thing that is truly good (such as saving Faith eminently is); but that it is necessary that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, and renewed in understanding, inclination, and will, and all his faculties, in order that he may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good, according to the Word of Christ, John 15:5, “Without me you can do nothing.”
Article 4
That this grace of God is the beginning, continuance, and accomplishment of all good, even to the extent that the regenerate man himself, without prevenient or assisting, awakening, following and cooperative grace, can neither think, will, nor do good, nor withstand any temptations to evil; so that all good deeds or movements that can be conceived must be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. But with respect to the mode of the operation of this grace, it is not irresistible, since it is written concerning many, that they have resisted the Holy Spirit (Acts 7, and elsewhere in many places).
The Works of James Arminius: On the Free-Will of Man
This is my opinion concerning the Free-will of man: In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him. Yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of Divine Grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration or renovation, I consider that, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of Divine Grace.
I am also well aware of what Calvinists think their deterministic philosophy of human freewill entails. They are sorely mistaken. The fact that people will always choose to make their decisions based upon their strongest motive is nothing more than a truism. Of course, it is true! But the real issue is how did the motive to sin become the strongest motive in the first place? Calvinists believe God is not the author of sin; but, nonetheless, Determinism makes God the author of sin. They claim that man plunged himself into sin and is therefore morally responsible; but, nonetheless, Determinism tells us that God is the one who plunged man into sin and therefore God is the one who is morally responsible for man’s sin; meanwhile, man is merely the victim of necessity who is suffering the consequences for things beyond his control. This is no different than despising a man who is born blind as if he were the one responsible for being blind and justly being punished for some terrible crime against God. The longer article I have written, Why the Philosophy of Determinism is Strictly Incompatible to the Biblical Narrative and Christian Orthodoxy, explains this in depth.